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Abstract
Reciprocal cooperation is the act of working together with another individual to increase the 
likelihood that the other individual will continue to work together during future encounters. 
Reciprocal cooperation can be explained evolutionarily because it promotes the fitness of 
individuals in certain conditions. Cooperation is most commonly studied in humans. However 
less complex mammals such as rats display cooperative behaviors in certain conditions. This 
study examines the necessary conditions for cooperation in rats by testing the significance of 
housing conditions and prior interactions between cooperating rats. We found that rats did not 
cooperate at levels greater than chance.
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Cooperation is defined as one organism working together with another organism and may 
potentially entail an immediate cost to the helping individual (Dawkins, 1976). Cooperation is 
important for two main reasons. First, it is an important strategy for natural selection. Secondly, 
cooperation is important because as people, we greatly value cooperation in the workplace, in 
schools, and in society. Studying cooperation is important because if we better understand what 
factors influence it, then we can maximize the amount of cooperation that naturally occurs in 
everyday life.
Cooperation becomes a beneficial strategy for enhancing survival ability when 
interactions between individuals are likely to reoccur. In situations where interactions between 
individuals are unlikely to reoccur, cooperation becomes a less powerful strategy and 
competition is emphasized (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).  According to Dawkins (1976), vampire 
bats display cooperative behavior amongst individuals they frequently interact with. Vampire 
bats commonly regurgitate blood to bats that have not fed that night. While this comes at an 
immediate cost to the regurgitater, it helps to ensure the reciprocity  of the other bat in case the 
regurgitater does not find food on a future night (Dawkins, 1976). 
Cooperation is routinely assessed in many forms, the most salient example being the 
Prisoner's Dilemma.  The Prisoner's Dilemma is a game between two individuals (Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981). This situation goes as follows: two people are charged with a crime. They are 
interrogated separately and can either confess or deny committing the crime, and the level of  
punishment varies based upon degree of cooperation. Axelrod and Hamilton set out to determine 
whether cooperation was an evolutionarily plausible strategy in the presence of competition 
(1981). They used the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma model to create a situation to test different 
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strategies of competition and cooperation. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is simply the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game played multiple times with the same partner. In Axelrod and 
Hamilton's experiment, the game was simulated on computers. Programmers and mathematicians 
submitted their different strategies to compete against each other. The two “individuals” each 
simultaneously have the option to either  cooperate or defect. If both choose to cooperate, then 
the players each receive three points. If both players defect, then each player receives one point.  
However, if one player defects and the other cooperates, then the defecting player gets a greater 
reward of five points and the cooperating player gets zero points. Analogously, if both prisoners 
in our human scenario choose cooperation, they avoid prison.
Likewise, in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, the best outcome for both players combined 
is if both players cooperate throughout the game. However, from the individual's perspective, if 
one can be assured that the other player will always cooperate, or if it is the last trial of the game, 
the individual fares best by defecting. Additionally, if both players defect continuously, the 
situation is optimal for neither player. 
Among all the strategies in Axelrod and Hamilton's (1981) competition , one of the 
simplest strategies, Tit-for-Tat proved itself to be the strongest. The Tit-for-Tat strategy is simply 
to do exactly what the opposing member did in the previous trial. On the first trial, the Tit-for-Tat 
strategy begins with the assumption of cooperation. For example, let player one be using the Tit-
for-Tat strategy. According to the traditional Tit-for-Tat strategy, player one should cooperate on 
the first trial. After that, the Tit-for-Tat player simply copies the last move of the opposing player.  
After Tit-for-Tat won in the IPD game against all other competing strategies, Axelrod and 
Hamilton (1981) showed that the Tit-for-Tat strategy was “robust” because it survived by earning 
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a certain number of points per set of games among a variety of different strategies. After 
thousands of trials were run, the Tit-for-Tat programs were “surviving” above a certain level for 
the program to be declared “evolutionarily stable” in a situation where the majority of members 
use the Tit-for-Tat strategy. In real life, this means that in a population of individuals where 
resource patterns create a situation similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, a likely pattern in behavior 
that might arise is the Tit-for-Tat version of cooperation regarding shared resources.
Evolutionary Stability means that the program can continue to survive and succeed in 
remaining the dominant strategy when other, non-Tit-For-Tat strategies emerge. Finally, Axelrod 
and Hamilton (1981) demonstrate that the Tit-For-Tat strategy is “initially viable”, or able to 
succeed when introduced into a population of non-Tit-For-Tat strategies. These three factors, 
robustness, stability, and initial viability make the Tit-For-Tat strategy a legitimate possibility for  
a model of cooperation. Furthermore, the Tit-for-Tat strategy is the most well studied strategy 
relating to the social sciences for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is also currently the strategy 
best studied in people and one of the two only Prisoner's Dilemma strategies studied in rodents. 
For these reasons, the Tit-for-Tat strategy is used for this study.
There is some evidence that rats are more likely to cooperate with individuals they have 
previously interacted with in a cooperative manner. Rutte and Taborsky (2008) had rats pull a 
stick to gain food access for another rat. They found that rats whose cage-mate pulled the stick to 
feed others were more likely to reciprocate the behavior than were rats whose non-cage-mate did 
not pull the stick. Furthermore, rats whose cage-mate pulled the stick were more likely to pull the 
stick for other unfamiliar rats, which is an example of generalized cooperation.  
This current study aims to replicate and extend upon results from Viana (2010) by 
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demonstrating that under the specifications set by the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm, test rats 
cooperate with an experimenter-controlled “dummy” rat playing according to the Tit-for-Tat 
strategy, at a level greater than would be expected by chance as was found by Viana (2010). 
Secondly, it is predicted, based on previous non-Prisoner's Dilemma research, that rats which are 
paired with cage-matess as opposing partner, will cooperate at higher levels than rats that have 
never met the opposing player (Rutte & Taborsky, 2008). 
Methods
The basic design of this experiment is highly congruent to the previous prisoner dilemma 
studies using rats, particularly the Viana study (2010). Test rats were run through a double t-maze 
against a “dummy” rat. In a true prisoner's dilemma test, the rat would not be able to determine 
the location of the “dummy” rat before choosing an arm in the testing phase. In the Viana study, 
however, test rats could potentially see the arm occupied by the dummy rat through a clear door. 
To address this potential issue, the entry arm of the t-maze was lengthened and two sliding doors 
installed to prevent the rat from using the “dummy” rat's location as a visual cue to choose an 
arm. Scent cues were eliminated by thoroughly spraying and wiping down the maze in between 
animals with Nolvasan solution.  Sound cues were minimized by playing a computerized 
soundtrack of white noise during all trials. One arm represents the choice to cooperate, the other 
arm of the maze represents the choice to defect. The arms were randomly assigned to pairs of 
rats so as to prevent side biases. The payoff matrix (Figure 1) shows the numbers of 
reinforcements or punishments given to the rat depending on which arm is chosen. Rewards were 
in the form of Fruit Loop segments. Aversive stimuli were in the form of short puffs of 
compressed air from a canister. A small pilot study with rats was run prior to the current study to 
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determine that using less aversive stimuli like puffs of air remain aversive for a period of several 
weeks. This is important because the Viana study used a much more aversive stimulus, tail-
pinching.
Subjects:
 The subjects were 15 male Sprague-Dawleys housed in pairs and given free access to 
food and water. The rats were housed in pairs because previous studies have found that rats are 
more likely to cooperate with each other and be less aggressive if housed together (Schuster, 
Berger, & Swanson, 1993). Rats were given free access to food and water, as satiation affects 
motivation in that food deprivation decreases the likelihood for rats to cooperate (Viana, Gordo, 
Sucena & Moita, 2010). All subjects were completely naive to conditions of the experiment. Five 
additional rats were assigned to the study as “dummy” rats. The dummy rat is placed by the 
experimenter in the cooperate or defect box according to the Tit-for-Tat strategy and the test rat's 
arm choices. Dummy rats were not reused as experimental rats in order to ensure that 
experimental rats did not develop learned helplessness during the “dummy” trials. 
Out of the 15 initial experimental rats, three subjects were excluded based on failure to 
eat the Fruit Loops during trials after the acclimation phase. 
Analyses:
Independent groups t-tests were used to compare the final stabilized cooperation level for 
rats in the familiarity versus unfamiliarity groups. The cooperation level will simply be the 
portion of the trials the experimental rat cooperates per set of trials. In addition to overall level of  
cooperation, levels of mutual cooperation, overall defection, and mutual defection were 
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compared. A Bonferroni correction (N = 32 tests) was employed to control for the amount of 
comparisons being performed.
Results
A paired t-test for percent of cooperative responses during the first and the last set of 
trials showed no significant difference (p = 0.45). While not significant, the later trials were 
slightly higher in cooperation than the initial trials.  A paired t-test for cooperation levels across 
day one to day two shows  no significant difference (p = 0.18). However, there is a greater 
increase across the two days than between the first day and the second day. Additionally, a paired 
t-test between the percent of cooperative responses during the first day and during the sum of the 
rest of the days is also not significant (p = 0.23). Furthermore, the decrease in mutual defection 
seen between the first and second day of testing and the first through the final day of testing were 
not significant (p = 0.65). To test the hypothesis that rats paired with cage-mates would cooperate 
more than rats cooperating with unfamiliar rats,  unpaired t-tests were done and showed that 
there was no difference between groups on the final day of training or on the first day of training, 
(p = 0.81,  p = 0.76). Additionally, it is interesting to note that rats did not mutually defect at 
levels greater than would be expected by chance (p > .05). This means that rats did not enter into 
what is know as a “defection loop”, or a pattern of continually defecting. A Bonferroni correction 
was made (N = 32 tests) to account for multiple t-tests. Both with and without the correction, 
results were nonsignificant. 
Cooperative Behavior in Rats 9
Discussion
These results suggest that there was no impact  of familiarity on rats' level of cooperation 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Compared to Viana study (2010), the current experiment design 
differed in several important aspects. First, it was done over a more prolonged period; rats were 
trained and drug-tested over a period of two and a half months. The Viana study had a much 
smaller sample size, five rats, whereas the current study began with fifteen test rats. The sample 
size reduced to twelve after three rats were eliminated for failing to eat the reinforcements by the  
end of the first training day. While the larger sample size allowed for the potential for more 
power to detect results, it also led to the rats being tested every second to fourth day due to time 
constraints. Nonconsecutive test days may have led to decreased learning of the task in the test 
rats.
Additionally, unlike the Viana study, the test rats were trained to pass through a double-
walled chamber before reaching the goal box of the double t-maze. This eliminated any visual 
cues a rat might utilize  in choosing an arm. In the Viana study (2010), rats were run through a 
plexiglass maze that enabled rats to potentially see into the end box and determine placement of  
the dummy rat before choosing an arm to enter. In a true Prisoner's Dilemma task, players should 
have no interaction or cues from the opposing player between trials. Introducing additional 
information, such as visual cues regarding the dummy rat's cooperation status, changes the task 
from the Prisoner's Dilemma to a four category discrimination task. 
Another element that is different is that the current study used adult rats slightly over one 
year old, whereas the Viana study used younger adolescent rats. Future studies need to be done to 
determine whether age is a significant variable in determining rats' willingness to cooperate in a 
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Prisoner's Dilemma type situation. It is possible that there is a critical period for learning 
cooperative tasks, and that the rats in the current study had passed that period. Specifically, 
research demonstrates that as rats age, they lose a significant amount of frontal cortical 
functioning (Barense, Fox, & Baxter, 2002). The Prisoner's Dilemma task is heavily dependent 
upon frontal lobe function for the initial acquisition of the task, and minor frontal lobe 
impairment may account for why the rats did not successfully learn to cooperate in the present 
study (Barense, Fox, & Baxter, 2002).
One difference between the Viana study and this current study that is not likely to have 
any impact is the type of punishment used. The Viana study used tail pinches with a forceps. 
Puffs of air from a compressed air canister was adopted as a less painful and more humane 
option than tail pinches. After a brief pilot study, it was determined that puffs of air from a 
compressed air canister were avoided and remained avoided for a period of several weeks. Rats 
continued to consider the air puffs as aversive as evidenced by increased sudden movement away 
from the puff of air and occasional defecation. 
Limitations of the model:
The current study demonstrates some significant limitations of the rodent Iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma model. First, testing may need to be done on consecutive days for 
cooperation to occur. Second, the role of visual cues in arm choice needs to be further 
investigated. Third, further testing needs to be done to determine if there is indeed an age effect 
on cooperative behavior in rats. Finally, it is not necessary to assume that because this study did 
not find rats to cooperate at levels greater than would be expected by chance, that rats do not 
Cooperative Behavior in Rats          11
cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Intervening factors, such as rat age and nonconsecutive 
testing days may likely have limited results. Additionally, it would be erroneous to state that 
because the particular study suggested null results, that cooperation does not exist in rats, 
especially since previous studies have found otherwise (Viana, Gordo, Sucena, & Moita, 2010; 
Gardner et al., 1984).
It is, however, important to establish the conditions under which the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Tit-for-Tat condition lead to cooperation in order to develop a reliable and easily reproducible 
model for measuring cooperation in rodents. Once such a standardized model, including all 
necessary behavioral conditions for cooperation to hold, is established, the specific neurological 
factors that influence cooperation in rodents can be discerned. Because rodent models are the 
most common animal model for behavioral testing, it would greatly benefit the behavioral 
neuroscience field to have a standardized rat test for measuring cooperation.
The Prisoner's Dilemma model is useful, but perhaps not the ideal model for studying 
cooperation in rats. The model is effective in that it utilizes rats' natural foraging behavior.  
Additionally, the Prisoner's Dilemma model requires less extensive training compared to other 
rat cooperation tasks, which require more complicated behaviors such as pulling a string to give 
another rat access to food (Rutte & Taborsky, 2008). However, the current Prisoner's Dilemma 
model does have potential criticisms. The classic Tit-for-Tat strategy is not ideal. In computer 
models (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) the Tit-for-Tat strategy can result in what is known as a 
defection loop. This is when individuals get stuck in a pattern of repeatedly defecting in 
retaliation to a previous player's defection. Since animals and people are not always perfect 
responders, mistakes in responding can trigger the first few defections, which if both players are 
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using the Tit-for-Tat strategy will result in a never-ending series of defection. These unintentional 
responses or errors in responding are known as noise (Wu & Axelrod, 1995). Noise that results in 
defection will further the cycle of defection among Tit-For-Tat players. However, in the current 
study mutual defection was not shown to be above the level expected by chance. This means that 
the experimental rat did not enter defection loops with the dummy rat. It is possible that the 
experimental rats did not enter defection loops because they also make errors in favor of 
cooperation, not just defection. It is likely that some extent of the rat's behavior is purely due to 
chance mistakes, but unlike in computer models, our animal behavioral model does not result in 
excessive noise or defection loops. Thus, in the real world noise may actually resolve the 
potential issue of defection loops in the computer model of Tit-for-Tat.
Future Directions:
Another computerized strategy, Pavlov, is even more successful than Tit-for-Tat (Kraines 
& Kraines, 1987). Pavlov is a program that starts out with an equal probability of defecting or 
cooperating.  The program “learns” to behave in a manner similar to operant conditioning. If a 
response results in a favorable outcome such as gaining points in the Prisoner's Dilemma game-a 
reinforcing event-then the response will become more likely in the future. Additionally, because 
Pavlov can differentiate between individuals, it can easily develop different response preferences 
to each individual. Because of this increased flexibility, the Pavlov strategy is more robust, or 
able to take advantage of the varying strategies, than is Tit-for-Tat, which allows Pavlov to 
succeed in all populations.  Kraines and Kraines (1989) hypothesize that this this additional 
property makes Pavlov more representative of real world applications of cooperation than 
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Tit-for-Tat.
Because the Pavlov strategy more closely represents the strategy that is thought to occur 
in nature, it would be beneficial to test rats against a partner using the Pavlov strategy. Kraines 
and Kraines (1989) found that programs both following the Pavlov strategy learned to cooperate 
in the Tit-for-Tat fashion in the shortest number of trials when playing against a partner using the 
Pavlov strategy. Since our rats did not learn the cooperation task, perhaps using the Pavlov 
strategy to determine placement of the dummy rats would increase learning even with 
nonconsecutive training days.
Biological Basis of Cooperation:
The biological basis of cooperation has only recently begun to be examined. For the 
scientific study of cooperation to progress, more research on an animal model needs to be done 
to determine the best method through which to measure cooperation. Human behavior as 
complex as gambling has an accepted animal model (Bos, Lasthuis, Heijer, Johanneke,  & 
Spruijt, 2006). At the present time, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma provides the best lens 
through which to examine cooperation in both humans and non-humans. Human studies have 
found that cooperation during the IPD activates the pleasure centers in our brains which in itself 
is rewarding (Shinsuke, Kazuhisa, Syoken, Akiyama & Eizo, 2011). Whether people are 
wired to cooperate because it is biologically rewarding, or whether the brain changes to find 
cooperation rewarding as a result of experience, still remains unknown. A recent review on 
hormones affecting cooperation elaborates on this problem of causality regarding hormones 
(Soares, Bshary, Fusani, Goymann, Hau, Hirschenhauser, & Oliveira, 2011). The authors 
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conclude that while both situations potentially occur, fluctuations in levels of neurohormones 
may account for fluctuations in cooperativity. Other longer term fluctuations in hormones can 
either enhance or hinder an organism's ability to cooperate. Specifically, vasopressin, a 
neurohormone released in the hypothalamus, is necessary for the recognition of familiar 
individuals, a skill which is a precursor for cooperation. Other relevant hormones include 
testosterone, which increases aggression and therefore decreases cooperation, and oxytocin, 
which decreases amydala activation and increases trust in cooperative games. There are mixed 
results over the cognitive effect of estrogens, and whether or not there is an influence on 
cooperation (Soares, Bshary, Fusani, Goymann, Hau, Hirschenhauser, & Oliveira 2011).
Conclusion:
This study's failure to show significant levels of reciprocity-based cooperation should not 
be construed as evidence that rats do not cooperate. Instead, it should be interpreted as possible 
limitations for cooperation among rats. Perhaps the frequency of training periods, or 
opportunities for cooperation, must be daily for rats to cooperate above chance. Further testing 
also needs to be done to determine if older rats show similar patterns of reciprocal cooperation 
both in natural and laboratory settings. After this basic research is done, it will be possible to 
interpret the impact of drugs and hormones on cooperative behavior, and the neurobiological 
mechanisms that control the behavior.
Overall, it is clear that standardized and easily replicable animal models of cooperation 
are currently lacking. Without these well-researched animal models for studying cooperation, 
there is still much about the field that remains unknown. This project sheds light on factors that 
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may influence the ability of animals to cooperate, and calls into question whether previous 
studies are true examples of cooperation.
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Dummy Cooperate Dummy Defect 
Test Rat Cooperate Test: 2 Fruit Loops Test: 3 Puffs of Air
 Dummy: 2 Fruit Loops Dummy: 3 Fruit Loops
Test Rat Defect Test: 3 Fruit Loops Test: 1 Puff of Air
Dummy: 3 Puffs of Air Dummy: 1 Puff of Air
Figure 1 shows the contingency matrix used for the rat Prisoner's Dilemma.
Figure 2 (above) shows the average levels of daily cooperation for cagemate pairs and non-
cagemate pairs on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma task
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Figure 3 shows the average daily level of cooperation between all rat pairs. Rats cooperating 
ten times out of twenty are cooperating at levels expected by chance.
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